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Abstract
This paper surveys tax haven legislation and links the literature on tax havens
to the literature on asymmetric information. I argue that the core aim of tax haven
legislation is to create private information (secrecy) for the users of tax havens. This
leads to moral hazard and transaction costs in non-havens. The business model of
tax havens is illustrated by using Mauritsius and Jersey as case studies. I also
provide several real world examples of how secrecy jurisdictions lead to ine¢ cient
market outcomes and breach of regulations in non-haven countries. Both developed
and developing countries are harmed, but the consequences seem most detrimental
to developing countries.
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1 Introduction
Recently, states that previously have not been associated with the term tax haven have
become a target of scrutiny. In their latest Financial Secrecy Index, Tax Justice Networks
mentions the United Kingdom as the most important global player in the nancial secrecy
world due to their network of tax havens (such as the Cayman Islands, British Virgin
Islands and the Channel Islands).1 In 2012, the state of Delaware in the US landed
at the top of National Geographic magazines published list of the most secretive tax
havens in the world. Likewise, Nevada and Wyoming have been mentioned as states
that may deserve the label tax haven (see Dyreng et al. 2013). There are no generally
accepted criteria for determining what a tax haven is; yet the term tax haven is a
well-known and frequently used expression. It is also often used synonymously with or as
an alternative to o¤shore nancial center(OFC) and secrecy jurisdiction,although
neither of these terms has a generally accepted denition. In the literature, tax havens are
often associated with low or nil taxes; lack of transparency (in the operation of legislative,
legal or administrative provisions), and no requirement for a substantive local presence.
This paper attempts to obtain a clearer understanding of how a tax haven works and
to nd the common traits among these jurisdictions. I do so by describing the legislation
in two tax havens; showing that despite material di¤erences they essentially achieve the
same end outcome. One common feature is the preferential treatment of foreigners.
Another is the creation of secrecy (private information) that leads to moral hazard and
ultimately higher transaction costs. I show that a key feature of tax haven legislation is
to divert such costs to non-haven countries. In the following I use the terms tax haven
and secrecy jurisdiction interchangeably.
Asymmetric information and moral hazard are hardly mentioned in relation to tax
havens despite the fact that the Nobel Prize in economics in 2001 was awarded jointly to
G.A. Akerlof, M. Spence and J. Stiglitz for their work on how information asymmetries
impose transaction costs that impede market e¢ ciency. One example of transaction
costs related to tax havens is hidden bank accounts. Tax haven legislation prevents the
disclosure of information to third parties. This lowers the costs of tax evasion and presents
an income opportunity for individuals. Hidden bank accounts increase the excess burden
of taxation and leads to higher compliance cost in non-haven countries.2
The secrecy and anonymity that tax havens o¤er also make it harder to repatriate
stolen funds thereby lowering the costs of economic crime and theft from society. There
are many examples in developing countries of public funds being concealed in tax havens
1http://www.nancialsecrecyindex.com/
2Of course, information asymmetries may also create business opportunities (an example of which,
is trading in derivatives and futures), but these are of a di¤erent kind than the income opportunities
o¤ered by tax havens.
2
to enrich corrupt bureaucrats and politicians.3 Since tax havens make it more protable
to commit economic crimes, tax havens may lead to a deterioration of institutional quality
in countries where power is in the hands of a small elite. This is so because a small elite
can more easily weaken a countrys "checks and balances", thereby making it less di¢ cult
to steal from society. As will become clear later this is typically a problem in developing
countries.
The examples of hidden bank accounts and theft from society are examples of tax
evasion and economic crime, that is, illegal activities. Tax havens, however, also play an
important role in legal tax planning. Companies use holding rms in tax havens to defer
home taxation, to earn capital gains tax free, to send money in and out tax free, and
to govern their other companies and nancing. These are legal activities, but they may
also impose transaction costs on non-haven countries if they make the capital tax base
of non-haven states more tax sensitive. Multinationals that work through tax havens
and are engaged in tax avoidance may be monitored by their home country (where the
parent rm is located). But information about corporate transactions in tax havens is
still private unless the rm provides all relevant information. The rm may not know
that some information is relevant or it may want to hide it (typically in corruption
cases). Hence, the tax authorities may be given incomplete or misleading information in
tax planning cases. Recent high prole cases related to multinationals are the bribery
investigations of Yara and Telenor, and the Norwegian court case involving the drilling
company Transocean where incomplete information is an aspect of the trial.4 Aggressive
tax planning may cross the line from tax avoidance into tax evasion, and there is a ne
line between conduct that gives rise to a potential charge for tax evasion and conduct
that does not. The fact that information can be hidden in tax havens makes this line
even ner.
Another aspect of secrecy that has received scant attention in the economic literature
is the use of untraceable (anonymous) shell companies. These are companies that can be
set up without proof of identity, which can then be used to avoid responsibility for both
non-criminal and criminal activity. Although the international community has laid out
rules that require adequate and timely information on benecial ownership through the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), there is mounting evidence that corporate service
providers, not only in secrecy jurisdictions, but also in countries such as Britain and the
United States, do not comply with these rules. Numerous examples exists of anonymous
shell companies used to launder drug money, hide bribes, nance illegal arms shipments,
and in general to escape responsibility for acts that ultimately impose grave costs on
3See NOU 2009: 19, appendix 1.
4The bribery investigation in Yara and Telenor are detailed here (see e.g.,
http://www.newsinenglish.no/2014/03/13/telenor-tied-to-corruption-probe/)) and the Transocean case
here (see; http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/16/transocean-fraud-idUSL6N0PR38P20140716))
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society.5 Results from experiments in Sharman (2010) and Sharman et al. (2015) suggest
that traditional tax haven countries may have higher standards of corporate transparency
and disclosure than those found in the United States and the United Kingdom. Sharman
(2010), for example, states: "In the United States and the United Kingdom, anonymous
companies are freely available to anyone with an Internet connection and a few thousand
dollars." Against this background it is perhaps not unjustied that the U.K. and certain
U.S. states to an increasing degree are being identied as secrecy jurisdictions. The
implication is that international e¤orts to increase transparency face formidable obstacles.
The paper provides insights through examples and case studies about how the legisla-
tion in secrecy jurisdictions work. The examples are all documented and referenced. Tax
havens are by denition opaque, and it is precisely for this reason that the OECD has
forced them to sign information exchange treaties (TIEAs). These do not eliminate the
externalities that follow from legislation in secrecy jurisdictions. A requirement for using
a TIEA is that the tax authorities can link a tax evader to a specic tax haven. In order
to do so someone must have spilled evidence. Moreover, even when the requirements
for using a TIEA are satised, it may be the case that information does not exist or is
inadequate.
The information that is the backbone of this paper was obtained during my period as
the head of a Norwegian government commission that studied tax havens and their e¤ects
on developing countries.6 Much of the information would otherwise have been hard to
come by. The paper starts by looking at how the legal system in "tax haven" jurisdictions
works. In a next step I provide examples of how this leads to ine¢ cient outcomes in
markets and breech of regulations. The last part of the paper brings together research
from various scientic disciplines on how tax havens foster moral hazard and invoke
transaction costs in a wide range of settings.
2 The business model of secrecy jurisdictions
Many countries may be labeled as low tax countries in the sense that they o¤er low or zero
taxes on certain activities. Such states could be named tax havens if one only considers
the tax aspect. However, the set of rules that govern secrecy jurisdictions (and that are
often associated with the term tax haven) di¤er considerably from just o¤ering low taxes.
I argue that there are at least three features that set secrecy jurisdictions apart from
states with just low taxes. These are:
1. A ring-fenced system of law and taxation
5Evidence of this is detailed inSharman et al. (2012) and in NOU (2009).
6The report delivered by the commission is NOU 2009: 19 Tax havens and development and is obtain-
able as a pdf here: http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2223780/pdfs/nou200920090019000en_pdfs.pdf
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2. A special regime to ensure tax domicile for rms that are exempt from tax
3. Private information (secrecy) and lack of e¤ective supervision.
Normal states have elements of all these features, but they are used and implemented
in a very di¤erent way, as shall become clear in the continuation. Recently, the public
has become aware of the fact that countries perceived to be low-tax countries only, have
o¤ered special tax deals to multinationals. A prominent example is Ireland and its agree-
ment with Apple.7 The fact that countries enter into secret deals with companies can be
seen as a form of ring-fencing, but such practices make it harder to classify countries es-
pecially since information about them is private. Even Luxemburg by many dened as a
secrecy jurisdiction, has hidden its extensive network of special tax deals with companies
in fear of the EU clamping down on them as illegal state support and/or harmful tax
competition. Both the Irish and the Luxemburg case are now under consideration by the
EU for breach of EU-legislation.8
2.1 A ring-fenced system of law and taxation
Tax havens apply di¤erent legal and tax rules to foreign investors and their rms than to
local rms and residents. This is called ring-fencing. A common denominator for these
rules is that they are designed to make it attractive for foreign investors (non-residents) to
set up rms that are tax domiciled in the tax haven. A common feature when it comes to
these rms is that they are prevented from undertaking local operations or activities over
and above the formal activities associated with their registration and board membership.
Rules related to reporting and auditing that apply to domestic rms, do in general or
to a lesser extent apply to such rms. The reason is that they are exempted from
taxes or only face nominal taxes. Since the rules that govern these enterprises are very
favorable but bans them from operating locally, they are often called exempted companies
or international business companies.
Non-haven states may also have ring-fenced tax systems. The di¤erence, however,
is that ring-fenced tax systems in normal states have been created to attract rms to
invest in the local e conomy. In tax havens, the ring-fenced legislation is designed so that
foreign investors nd it attractive to set up holding companies in the secrecy jurisdiction
that invests elsewhere (in non-haven states). An example is a tax haven holding company
that nances subsidiaries abroad and receives dividends from these in order to defer home
taxation.
7On Ireland see: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/30/us-apple-ireland-tax-
idUSKCN0HP0QT20140930
8The Luxemburg case is described here: http://www.icij.org/project/luxembourg-leaks
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Ring-fencing also has a wider application. Tax fraud is a criminal o¤ense if you are a
resident of a tax haven, but not if you are a foreign investor. The reason is that foreign
investors (in general) do not pay tax in the tax haven so by denition they cannot evade
taxes. And tax evasion elsewhere is not a concern for the tax haven even if its legislation
may encourage tax evasion. Before the OECD started its work on information exchange
treaties, tax havens would only exchange information if the action taken by an individual
was a criminal o¤ense in both states in question. Since tax fraud was not a criminal
o¤ense in the tax haven, no information was disclosed. With the information exchange
treaties this has changed, but the change was not brought forward voluntarily.
In order to see how ring-fencing work in practice and di¤er among so called tax haven
jurisdictions, I shall survey two jurisdictions that have been associated with the term tax
haven namely Jersey and Mauritius.
2.1.1 Mauritius
In Mauritius, neither residents nor non-residents pay capital gains tax, inheritance or
wealth tax. In order to attract foreign investors, Mauritius o¤ers two types of companies
that are only accessible to non-residents. These companies, called Global Business Com-
pany 1 and 2 (hereafter GBC1 and GBC2), cannot use local currency and their business
must be conducted elsewhere. GBC1 companies must use locals for company registration
purposes and as board members in order to ensure that the company is managed from
Mauritius and thus tax domiciled there.
The corporate tax rate in Mauritius is 15% and applies to both domestic (local)
companies and GBC1 companies. GBC1 companies are given an automatic foreign tax
credit which yields an 80% reduction in the 15% rate irrespective of whether foreign taxes
are incurred or not. This means that the nominal tax rate is 3% for GBC1 companies,
which should be contrasted to non-haven countries, where tax credits are only given
based on documented source taxes falling on repatriated income. GBC1 companies can
also claim an actual tax credit for any tax paid abroad, and will use whatever rule is
most favorable. In reality, as the Norwegian Capital ight Commission found, GBC1
companies do not pay tax (see NOU 2009, ch 7).
GBC2 companies are exempt from Mauritius tax law and face a zero tax rate. They
can be set up on a very short notice. A GBC2 company should le accounts, but there are
no audits, nor is the rms accounts publicly available and a GBC2 company is exempted
from the duty to preserve important corporate documents. Benecial ownership is not
disclosed to the authorities. The total sum of all the liberal provisions applied to GBC2
companies makes it very hard to obtain any form of information about these companies.
Mauritius also allows so-called protected cell companies (PCC), which can only be
used by non-residents. Such companies can divide their assets and liabilities into di¤erent
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cells, each of which has its own name. The total number of cells comprises the entire
company, which provides very good protection against third parties attempting to obtain
information on or seize these assets.
In sum, there are no publicly accessible records of benecial owners or shareholders
for GBC-companies in Mauritius, and shares may be held by a nominee on behalf of a
benecial owner. There is no requirement to le an annual company return, and GBC
companies can use a corporate shareholder.
2.1.2 Jersey
Before 2008 companies tax domiciled in Jersey paid a statutory corporate tax rate of
20%. Foreign owned companies that did not have any activity on Jersey, could pay a
fee (between GBP 200 600) and obtain tax-exempt status. International pressure on
Jersey lead to a corporate tax reform on June 3, 2008.
The new system abolished the category of exempt company. It invoked a standard
corporate tax rate of 0%, but included two other non-zero corporate tax brackets. Fi-
nancial service companies faced a tax rate of 10%; whereas utility companies and income
specically derived from Jersey property rentals or Jersey property development faced a
rate of 20%.
The new system ensures ring-fencing since all the important local businesses pay tax,
whereas foreign investor companies are still tax exempt. Furthermore, companies that
have shareholders who are Jersey residents fall into a special category. Jersey shareholders
are taxed at 20% for their share in the companys income. This increases compliance de-
mands for foreign controlled companies with Jersey residents shareholders and, therefore,
imply that Jersey residents are less desirable as shareholders in these companies.
In Jersey, unlisted companies that face the 0% rate do not need to submit nancial
records or have an audit. Such companies must keep annual records, but these records
often only contain information about the shareholding capital, the number of shares and
who the owners are. Real benecial owners may remain hidden (an example is provided
later in this section).
The examples of Jersey and Mauritius show that while foreigners and their rms are
tax exempt, local residents and businesses face tax. Jersey and Mauritius have achieved
this through di¤erent types of arrangements, but to the same end e¤ect. Both jurisdic-
tions derive income from registration fees, licence fees and annual fees for maintaining
registration. Service providers and nominees are also paid for their services.
Similar rules are in place in other tax havens. In Delaware, for example, limited
liability companies (LLC companies) must have a Delaware Registered O¢ ce, a secretary,
and at least one director. The director can be a corporation, meetings can be held
anywhere, the public le need only contain the name of the company, incorporation
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number, date of incorporation and details of registered agent, and no records of the
companys business need be kept in Delaware. These rules apply if no business activity
is carried out in the US. LLC companies pay $100 annual tax and are otherwise tax free.
As is clear from the above, Delaware does not collect any information about who the real
benecial owners of a company are. From a transparency point of view this is worrisome
and it obviously creates private information.
An important part of making a tax haven attractive for foreign investors is to ensure
that a foreign owned rm can be tax domiciled there despite the fact that the company
is merely a shell company, that is, the company does not have any signicant assets or
operations in the tax haven. I will discuss tax domicile in the continuation.
2.2 Tax domicile
A crucial element in the business model of tax havens is that of tax domicile. In most
countries, a company is generally treated as a resident for tax purposes based on where
its central management and control are exercised. The term "central management and
control" refers to the highest level of oversight, usually as exercised by the board, rather
than day-to-day management. Since the ring-fenced legislation of most tax havens for-
bids local activity, tax domicile is ensured by the requirement that a rm appoints a
su¢ cient number of local residents as board members. In addition, it is recommended
that a number of board meetings are held in the tax haven. Incorporation only does
not guarantee tax domicile. A major question related to tax domicile is if local board
members are straw men instructed from elsewhere so that the central management and
control and thus the "real board" is in another state altogether.
There are many examples that highlight the problem of tax domicile. In the 1980s,
the Channel Islands became famous for the "Sark Lark." Under the laws of Guernsey
and Jersey in existence at the time, all companies were liable for corporate taxes unless
the annual directorsmeetings were held outside of Guernsey and Jersey, i.e. o¤shore
from the main Channel Isles. As a result, thousands of Jersey and Guernsey companies
appointed Sark directors and held board meetings in Sark or in nearby French towns
where companies bought Sark addresses without any physical presence on the island.
The case against Phil Crowshaw is illustrative of this. He was a Sark resident who rented
out his name to 3,378 companies that needed a director or a board member, each rm
paying between 50 and 400 pounds for the use of his name. When some of the companies
for which Crowshaw was legally responsible committed criminal o¤enses, the UK took
action against him and the high court of Manchester disqualied him from acting as a
director of any UK company.9
9For a description of this case see http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/stamping-out-the-
sark-lark-1102707.html
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In general, the amount of responsibility that falls on a limited number of board mem-
bers in tax havens is overwhelming. For example, no less than 830,000 companies were
registered in the British Virgin Islands (BVI) in 2012. BVI had in 2012 approximately
31,000 inhabitants. On average each inhabitant holds approximately 27 Directorships.
In comparison, a country like Norway with ve million inhabitants had approximately
270,000 limited liability companies in 2012, averaging 0,05 directorships per capita. On
average a BVI resident had 540 times as many directorships as a Norwegian in 2012.
Given that some of these must be locals to ensure tax domicile, it is natural to worry
about whether they are directors in name only.
The issue of tax domicile in tax havens has lead to the perception that the highest level
of oversight occurs outside the tax haven and that many directors are directors in name
only, not in substance, and that the real directors are other people altogether in other
jurisdictions. This perception has gained force from reports that directors in tax haven
rms sometimes assign their powers as directors by general power of attorney to others
and provide undated letters of resignation. Jersey, for example, allows such letters.10
These letters are often kept by service providers who represent the shareholders. A
frequent argument for this practice is administrative ease, but such letters also provide a
powerful tool for instilling obedience into local board members who derive a signicant
part of their income from board service.11 The implication is that someone else than the
directors may make decisions. Who these people are is private information.
In many tax havens a response to the critique about board members has been to
allow corporations to be a board member. A corporate board member may be a service
provider or a law rm that acts as a director. Corporate board members often register
their phone calls and correspondence with the company owners in order to charge them
for their services, though it is often very di¢ cult to establish whether a corporate board
member has been instructed or simply sought information before making a decision.
Where decisions are taken is often private information. Are decisions made prior to
the board meeting in another jurisdiction so that the real seat of the board is there? If so
the rm should be tax domiciled where these decisions are taken. The di¤erence between
tax havens and normal states is the requirement in tax havens to use local residents as
board members and directors in order to ensure tax domicile. Since it is private infor-
mation where decisions are taken, tax havens can use such an arrangement to establish
tax domicile. Countries incur costs to reveal the true nature of such arrangements and
they come in the form of domestic law or controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules. The
use of domestic law imply that the tax authorities must establish that the board level
functions are performed somewhere else other than in the tax haven. This invokes admin-
10To meet the criticism of being a director only in name, directors now need a license in Jersey.
11This argument was made in the Edward Report (2009). Review of Financial Regulation in the Crown
Dependencies Part 1, section 13.2. Jersey Financial Service Commission.
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istrative and investigative costs CFC rules vary across states, but the basic enforcement
mechanism is that taxpayers resident in a non-haven, who have a controlling interest in
foreign companies located in low-tax jurisdictions are taxed on their share of the foreign
companys attributable income.For CFC rules to apply, the tax authorities must be
informed by the taxpayers that they hold a controlling share in such companies. Tax-
payers who want to avoid taxation can do so by either not reporting their shareholding,
or by making arrangements through the use of nominee shareholders in tax havens so
that it appears as if they no longer hold a controlling stake. This means that resources
are used to conceal the realities. For CFC rules to be e¤ective, truthful self-reporting is
required. One of the lessons learned from the last decade of research into tax compliance
is that tax payers are more prone to misreport income when they self-report (see Kleven
et al. 2011).
2.3 Private information (secrecy) and lack of e¤ective supervi-
sion
It is not obvious how one should dene secrecy. Hines and Rice (1994) dene this as
legislation that supports banking and business secrecy. In its report on the use of se-
crecy jurisdictions by American corporations, the U.S. Government Accountability O¢ ce
(2008) similarly describes it as a lack of e¤ective exchange of tax information with foreign
tax authorities and a lack of transparency in the operation of legislative, legal or admin-
istrative provisions. As part of its harmful tax competition initiative, the OECD (1998)
characterizes secrecy as the existence of laws or administrative practices that prevent the
distribution of e¤ective information for tax purposes with other governments.
Secrecy takes many forms in tax havens. The most common one, and the one that
most people associate with tax havens, is an unwillingness to comply with information
requests from third parties. In most non-haven countries, there is a public registry that
requires companies to le nancial accounts. In tax havens, rms may be required to le
annual records. These are often limited to recording the names of the shareholders, the
number of shares and the amount of capital invested. Often the real benecial owners
are not disclosed to the public or the authorities. Public supervision and audits are not
necessary when there is no taxation and no local creditors since the rm cannot operate
locally.
In normal states, favored industries are monitored and supervised in order to ensure
that privileges do not spill over. In tax havens, it is the opposite. Supervision and the
enforcement of rules and regulation are costly, particularly in a small population and have
no income side, since foreign investor rms do not pay tax and cannot operate locally.
In addition, supervision implies transparency, which goes against the desire of many tax
haven users. The case of Cyprus is revealing. Despite international regulation (such as
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the Financial Action Task Force and being a member of the EU), the main Norwegian
business newspaper, Dagens Næringsliv, was denied access to the public Cyprus company
registry. After a court order that granted the newspaper access, its investigation revealed
that the registry was at least 10 years behind in rm registration, and that rms could
leave out important nancial records in their lings without any risk of detection or
penalty.12
2.3.1 Information Exchange Treaties
In order to avoid being blacklisted by the OECD, secrecy jurisdictions have been forced
to sign tax information exchange tax treaties (TIEAs). Under TIEAs, the requesting
jurisdiction must provide signicant accurate information in the letter of request to iden-
tify a specic person, transaction, account, trust or company linked to the suspicion in
question, and the tax purpose for seeking this information. It must also provide evi-
dence of why it believes the requested jurisdiction holds the information in question, and
demonstrate that it has exhausted all other means of information (within reason).13
TIEAs imply that only when the tax authorities in a given country have obtained
information from elsewhere that links a tax evader to a tax haven jurisdiction, can a
TIEA request be submitted. TIEAs give tax havens incentives not to spill evidence and
to guard their secrecy. Paradoxically, then, TIEAs may lead to less transparency. On
the other hand, TIEAs may create the perception among taxpayers that the risk of being
caught has increased. If so, this may lead to less tax evasion. The need for TIEAs,
however, has arisen from moral hazard and asymmetric information that follow from tax
haven legislation. Not only is it costly to sign such treaties, but a requesting jurisdiction
needs to divert substantial resources in order to comply with the details of such requests.
2.3.2 Trusts
Government reports, non-governmental organizations, and court cases in various countries
point to that individual can evade taxes by using trusts in tax havens.14 A trust is a
collection of assets where a person (the trust settlor) gives up the asset(s) for the benet
of someone else (the beneciary) under a trust deed. The trustees formally hold the
(collection of) assets on trust and for the benet of the beneciaries. Court cases have
shown that certain tax havens allow the settlor to merely pretend to have given away the
12See Dagens Næringsliv 8.11.2012. A picture of the archive and the feature article can be found at:
http://www.dn.no/forsiden/naringsliv/article2503986.ece
13Under a TIEA agreement, it does not su¢ ce for a requesting country to provide evidence that a
certain tax payer has evaded taxes at home, and, based on this evidence, request information about
deposits in another jurisdiction. Such requests are labeled shing expeditions since the requesting
jurisdiction does not have evidence that links the taxpayer to the requested jurisdiction.
14See Gravelle (2013) and Tax Justice Network (http://nl.tackletaxhavens.com/wat-is-een-
belastingparadijs/the-lingo/)
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asset (thus potentially escaping the tax bill on its income, for example), while in reality
still controlling it.15 The US Internal Revenue Service describes the problem as follows:
"The foreign trust schemes usually start o¤ as a series of domestic trusts layered upon
one another. This set up is used to give the appearance that the taxpayer has turned
his/her business and assets over to a trust and is no longer in control of the business or
its assets. Once transferred to the domestic trust, the income and expenses are passed to
one or more foreign trusts, typically in tax haven countries."16
In many normal states (but not all) the ability to conceal the existence of a trust
and to hide distributions from trusts has been thwarted by the setting up of public trust
registries. In tax haven jurisdictions, but also in many countries based on English law,
a trust is normally a private agreement. The implication is that the trust is not known
to the general public or for the tax authorities. Although there are rules that guard
against the misuse of trusts, there is no e¤ective enforcement of these rules in secrecy
jurisdictions, since those who benet from the rules do not reside in the tax haven or pay
tax there. In essence then, such structures are an open invitation to abuse. It is for such
reasons that The European Parliaments economics committee and justice committee on
February 2014 voted to bring trusts fully into the Fourth Money Laundering Directives
transparency requirements by setting up a public registry for all EU member states.17
Public trust registries may exists in secrecy jurisdictions, but are either voluntary,
only apply to locals, or can be set up so that the public cannot get access to informa-
tion. An example is Liechtenstein, which has a Public Register. However, one can avoid
registration by depositing the trust deed with the Land and Public Register O¢ ce. The
benet of such an arrangement is that a deposited trust does then not exist in any register
accessible to the public. Inspection of information provided is possible only if evidence
of a justied interest can be produced.18
2.4 Tax haven benets
Tax havens earn income from the nancial sector that serves foreign investors; they earn
fees from maintaining company registration and accounts; and they derive income from
local service providers and law rms that set up and administrate foreign investor a¤airs.
In Jersey, for example, approximately 50 percent of GDP comes from the nancial sector
and rms that can broadly be described as servicing foreign investors and their Jersey
rms.
15One of many examples is a seller of baby equipment who had set up trusts in Liechtenstein The
court case revealed that he controlled the trusts and had used them to channel income and hide bank
deposits. See http://www.bt.no/nyheter/okonomi/Babykos-grnder-domt-til-fengsel-2569039.html
16See: http://www.irs.gov/uac/What-are-some-of-the-Most-Common-Abusive-Tax-Schemes%3F
17See http://www.step.org/meps-vote-name-trust-beneciaries-public-registries
18For the rules guarding trusts in Lichtenstein see e.g.; http://www.atrium-incorporators.com/trust-
formation-in-liechtenstein/
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The amount of capital that passes through secrecy jurisdictions is large and the tax
haven jurisdictions are often small countries. The spin-o¤s are therefore considerable.
According to Hines (2010): Tax havens are small: most are islands, all but a few have
populations below one million: and they have above-average incomes.Of course, the
statement by Hines is meant to reect averages, and larger countries such as Belgium,
Ireland, the Netherlands and Switzerland have also been listed as tax havens by various
organizations (see NOU 2009, chapter 2).
For foreign investors the attraction of a tax haven is nil or only nominal taxes, deferral
of home taxation, lax regulation, almost no costs related to compliance, and the ability
to conceal information. Investment through tax havens are also safe. According to Hines
and Dharmapala (2009) who controls for other relevant factors, governance quality has a
statistically signicant and qualitatively large association with the probability of being a
tax haven. The fact that governance quality is important implies that foreign investors
care very much about whether their money is safe or not.
There is a literature that discusses the benets of tax havens in the context of global
tax competition. Desai, Foley and Hines (2006) argue that while tax planning may reduce
revenues of high-tax jurisdictions, it may have o¤setting e¤ects on real investment that
are attractive to governments. If, for some reason, a government is restricted from taxing
mobile and immobile capital di¤erently, a tax haven may allow mobile capital to avoid
a tax that would otherwise have been fully shifted onto immobile production factors.
Hong and Smart (2010) show that debt shifting by a multinational with a nancing
subsidiary located in a tax haven and an operational subsidiary located in a high-tax
host country, increases welfare in the country that hosts the operational subsidiary. The
argument is that the multinational rm is able to avoid an ine¢ cient tax on mobile
capital. Gresik, Schindler and Schjelderup (2015) show that the welfare optimum in the
Hong and Smart paper is a tax rate of 100% and that the multinational a¢ liate must
be 100% debt nanced. They also show that adding prot shifting to the Hong and
Smart model may facilitate aggressive transfer pricing that results in lower host country
welfare. Slemrod and Wilson (2009) demonstrate that the presence of tax havens that
sell "concealment services" to rms in non-haven countries increases the social costs that
a country incurs when raising its capital tax. They nd that this aggravates the tax
competition problem and that eliminating tax havens raises the equilibrium taxes and
public good supplies, thereby increasing welfare in all countries. There is a substantial
literature on how the prot-shifting activities of tax havens a¤ect tax competition and
welfare between countries. This literature is surveyed in Wilson (2015), who concludes
that there remain conicting answers to the question of whether tax havens add to or
diminish the ine¢ ciencies associated with tax competition.
From the perspective of someone who uses a tax haven, it is the combined e¤ects of a
ring-fenced legislation, rules for tax domicile, and secrecy that make tax havens attractive.
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The way ring-fencing works means that secrecy jurisdictions do not have any incentives
to enforce regulations and supervision. When this is paired with condentiality, a string
of externalities follows. Since rms registered in tax havens must operate in other states,
the implication is that the externalities that follow from tax haven legislation occur in
non-haven states. By applying a revealed preference argument, it follows that tax havens
view their own ring-fenced legislation as harmful or they would otherwise have allowed
the legislation to apply to all rms including those that operate domestically.
3 Tax havens and the costs of asymmetric informa-
tion
Tax havens create asymmetric information because it is not clear who owns assets, who
really act as board members, and who is ultimately responsible. This imposes costs on
third parties because they must exert more e¤ort than usual to obtain information, if at
all possible, and they must invest in safeguards to combat the moral hazard incentives
that tax havens create. The ability to conceal information from third parties also lowers
the costs of committing crimes and violating regulation because the likelihood of detection
is lowered.
The company registries are also not opaque. The case of Cyprus mentioned earlier
shows that the registries are not up to date, and that they fail to check whether all
required information has been submitted. Generally, there are no strict penalties for not
adhering to reporting requirements in tax havens (in the case of Cyprus they admitted to
no such costs), and if such requirements are in place, they are rarely enforced (see NOU
2009). Furthermore, the information that rms are required to submit to tax haven
company registries is minimized so as to give very little away. An example of this is
involves the worlds largest sovereign wealth fund, Norwegian Government Pension Fund
Global. In 2013, the fund invested 1,8 billion NOK in the Formula 1 business through a
Jersey company called Jura Ltd. Investigating journalists could not obtain annual records
of Jura Ltd nor ascertain who the real benecial owners of the company were. In the
rms annual accounts a Jersey service provider was listed as the owner. No information
about board members (if any) existed, and the company did not have a contact person.19
Jersey is one of the jurisdictions I have described in detail above. Because of the
"Sark Lark" and related scandals that tainted the reputation of the British Channel Is-
lands, Treasury o¢ cial Andrew Edwards was appointed to write a report and suggest
legislative changes. In his report Edwards made a number of suggestions aimed at in-
creasing transparency.20 However, most of the proposals were rejected by then British
19The case is descirbed in detail in Dagens Næringsliv 16.03.2013. See
http://www.dn.no/nyheter/2014/03/16/Oljefondet-i-Formel-1/formel-1-et-korthus
20See the Edward Report (2009). Review of Financial Regulation in the Crown Dependencies . Jersey
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prime minister, Tony Blair.21 A quote from the Edwards report illustrates one type of
cost related to opacity: "If public policy emphasizes privacy above transparency, the
greatest beneciaries are likely to be criminals."
Secrecy jurisdictions make it harder to identify the ultimate owner of an asset and
therefore provide the means to avoid detection and penalties for wrongdoing. In com-
bination with the lack of regulation and/or e¤ective supervision, the legislation creates
asymmetric information that leads to moral hazard and transactions costs. Below I
present some examples.
3.1 Tax evasion and the nancial sector
The ability to conceal wealth and income is one of the attractions that tax havens o¤er
at lowers costs than non-haven states. The United States allegedly loses in excess of
USD 100 billion annually in tax revenue due to undeclared bank deposits o¤shore, tax
evasion and avoidance by multinational corporations.22 The Norwegian tax authority
estimates that its taxpayers have undeclared bank deposits in excess of USD 35 billion
in tax havens.23 Norway has 5 million inhabitants.
Financial secrecy and o¤shore tax evasion are widespread and ingrained in the nan-
cial system in some tax haven countries. Two examples are UBS, the largest Swiss bank,
and Wegelin, the oldest bank in Switzerland. In 2009, UBS accepted a ne of USD 780
million on charges of conspiring to defraud the United States by impeding the Internal
Revenue Service.24 UBS had secretly sent its employees into the United States where
they engaged in illegal banking activities that included soliciting U.S. taxpayers to open
secret bank accounts with full knowledge that it was helping them commit tax evasion.
Wegelin, the oldest bank in Switzerland, pleaded guilty in New York City in 2013 to
criminal charges for helping wealthy American customers evade taxes by hiding more
than $1.2 billion in secret accounts. Wegelin bank o¢ cials admitted that the bank had
campaigned UBSdeparting customers to move their secret accounts to Wegelin where
they would continue to be hidden and free of tax. Wegelin pleaded guilty to the criminal
charges by the US state attorney and paid $74 million in nes, restitution and forfeited
funds, which ultimately lead the bank to close its doors.
In 2014, the Swiss Bank Credit Suisse AG pleaded guilty to helping wealthy Americans
avoid paying taxes through secret o¤shore accounts. The bank has agreed to pay about
Financial Service Commission.
21Blairs failure to implement such changes to Jersey Law was highlihted in the Guradian, see
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/nov/28/o¤shore-secrets-government-act-disclosures
22U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations: Tax haven banks and U.S. tax compliance,
July 17, 2008 and http://www.justice.gov/tax/UBS_Signed_Deferred_Prosecution_Agreement.pdf,
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/bank_agreement.pdf
23See http://www.skatteetaten.no/upload/PDFer/Skatteetatens_analysenytt/Hva_vet_vi_bruk_skatteparadis.pdf
24NOU (2009), page 25.
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$2.6 billion in nes to the U.S. government. According to US o¢ cials, the bank had
been operating this tax evasion fraud for decades. The US Senate subcommittee of
investigations who investigated the case found the bank provided accounts in Switzerland
for more than 22,000 U.S. clients totaling $10 billion to $12 billion.25 Another well
known case mainly involving European tax payers is the so called LTG Scandal. It
involved hidden accounts held by the LGT Group, a bank managed by the principality
of Liechtenstein.
The ability to conceal income and wealth in tax haven bank accounts is an example
where tax haven legislation lead to moral hazard actions by banks that in turn fosters
tax evasion. It is ability to make information about bank deposits private information
that lowers the costs of tax evasion. For society, lower evasion costs imply that the tax
base becomes more tax sensitive. It also implies a narrower tax base, which in turn
increases the excess burden of taxation rises. There are also administrative costs to tax
evasion and these costs can substantial. One example is the Norwegian Tax authorities
investigation into tax evasion by the ship-owner Anders Jahre and his hidden wealth in the
Cayman Islands. The case was investigated continuously for 35 years by the Norwegian
tax authorities and the costs amount to 63 million euro just for this case.26
3.2 Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing27
A large number of scientic studies have shown a very signicant decline in important
sh stocks around the world and have pointed out that a major reason for this is excessive
shing, of which a substantial part is illegal shing.28 It is widely acknowledged that ship
registration in states that o¤er ags of convenience, among them typical tax havens, is
integral to the problem of illegal, unreported and unregulated shing (IUU), see OECD
(2004). Recent reports assess the worldwide value of IUU catches at USD 1023.5 billion
a year. In perspective, this comprises between 13-31% of global catches.29
Vessels that sail under a ag of convenience do not have to pay for shing licenses
and vessel monitoring systems, or abide by national or international regulations and
rules meant to preserve sh stocks, safety, worker conditions or the environment. These
low-cost advantages may be combined with owner anonymity, particularly if the vessel
25Details of this case and others are found in "O¤shore Tax Evasion : The E¤ort to Collect Unpaid
Taxes on Billions in Hidden O¤shore Accounts. United States Subcommittee on Investigations, February
26, 2014.Home page: http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations
26The case is described in detail in NOU (2009; page 29).
27Illegal shing takes place where ships operate in violation of the shery laws. Unreported shing is
shing that is unreported or misreported to the relevant authority in contravention of applicable laws
and regulations. Unregulated shing is shing carried out by vessels without nationality, or vessels ying
the ag of a state that is not party to the regional organization governing the particular shing areas or
shing for sh stocks where there are no conservation and management measures in place.
28A detailes are given by the Swedish FAO Committee (2009) and in Stølsvik (2007).
29The various estimates are given in FAO (2010), EJF (2010), and High Sea Task Force (2006).
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is owned by an anonymous shell company - making it possible to violate national and
international rules without facing the consequences of evading national and international
regulation of sh stocks.
There are many types of costs arising from asymmetric information about ownership
of these vessels. One type of cost is related to food safety, since sh stocks cannot be
managed properly.30 The ability to obtain anonymity also means that safety is disre-
garded. The term oating co¢ nhas been used to reect the poor condition of many
IUU vessels, some of which have been allowed to deteriorate to the point of not being
seaworthy, with no life rafts, ares, radio or radar.31
One of the darker sides of IUU shing is the abuse of human rights. IUU shing vessels
draft workers on contracts (if a contract exists at all) signed by ctitious companies, which
are described as grossly unfair.32 In a report from the World Wildlife Foundation and
the Australian government (see Gianni and Simpson, 2005), physical and psychological
mistreatment of crew on board IUU vessels is mentioned as a frequent occurrence, and
Asian crew members have been known to work as forced labor sometimes chained while
at sea or in port.33
3.3 Safety
The ability to hide who the benecial owner is provides weak incentives to adhere to
regulation in transport. One example of this is the Scandinavian Star accident. On the
night of April 7, 1990, a re broke out on the ferry known as the Scandinavian Star, which
was on its way from Oslo (Norway) to Fredrikshavn (Denmark). The re killed 158 people
and two persons died later as a result of injuries related to the re. The investigation
of the re showed that the ship had some serious defects and that security regulations
had not been followed. Since the ship was registered in the Bahamas, it has thus far not
been possible to establish who the real owners of the ship are, so they can therefore not
be brought to court. In this case the ability to hide from the authorities who the real
owner was, also lowers the costs of non-compliance to regulation. For society and the
passengers, the costs related to asymmetric information in this case were devastating.
It is not only sea transport that is a¤ected by tax havens. In 2009, the main business
newspaper in Norway revealed that the airline company Scandinavian Airline Systems
(SAS) leased passenger planes from anonymous companies in the Cayman Islands (i.e.
the benecial owner could not be established). According to Gjernes and Kibar (2009),
SAS did not lease the airplanes directly from Cayman companies, but instead used a
30The Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF, 2010) lists some ags of convenience states that often
are labelled tax havens. These are Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, the
Isle of Man, Mauritius, Panama, and Singapore.
31For the use of this term see EJF (2010; p. 9).
32These contracts are described in OECD, (2004) and High Sea Task Force (2006; pp. 33-34).
33See Gianni and Simpson 2005, p. 34.
17
go-between company called Babcock and Brown, which was located outside the Cayman
Islands. Gjernes and Kibar (2009) found that the Norwegian aviation authorities had
registered 383 incidents on SAS ights in the last ve years leading up to 2009, and 274
of these had not been investigated. Many of these incidents pertained to the Cayman
Island planes, while investigations carried out by Gjernes and Kibar (2009) showed that
it was not possible to establish the identity of the benecial owners of these planes.
The main point in relation to these two stories is twofold. First, the use of secrecy
jurisdictions makes it possible for owners to hide information about assets of importance
to public safety. Second, if an accident occurs and it turns out that the owner is wholly
or partially to blame, the owner will remain hidden. Consequently, the owner does not
bear the full cost of negligence and this leads to a moral hazard problem.
In industries such as the airline industry, in which safety is a major concern, national
authorities respond to asymmetric information by setting up their own safety regulating
bodies to unravel asymmetric information and ensure that service and maintenance are
undertaken according to high standards. The ability to keep information private, however,
gives owners weaker incentives for care and maintenance than if their identities were
visible and increases regulatory costs.
3.4 Tax havens and developing countries
In the subsections above, I have given examples of harm caused by tax haven legislation.
These costs arise because tax havens provide an economic opportunity to enrich oneself
at the expense of others due to the income opportunities created by the ability to hide
information. In this section I shall argue that the costs of moral hazard and asymmetric
information are more harmful to developing countries than industrialized countries. One
obvious reason is that lower tax revenue due to tax evasion, has a greater social cost in
developing countries, since their need for public spending is greater. Developing countries
also sets themselves apart from rich countries in that their institutions are weaker and
corruption more rampant. This makes developing countries more vulnerable to the income
opportunities that tax havens present. The costs that follows take various forms, and I
shall discuss some of them below. In doing so I build on existing theory.34
3.4.1 Theft of government money
The misuse of power and theft of state money combined with the use of tax havens
among the political elite is widespread and well documented. The Democratic Republic
of Congo, Zaire (DRC), is a well-known example. Mobutu Sese Seko was in power in
the DRC from 1965 to 1997. His political position enabled him to steal from society and
tax havens were helping him to conceal his theft. As shown by Acemoglu, Robinson and
34Parts of the following subsection builds on Torvik (2009).
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Verdier (2004), the consequences were devastating. Income in the DRC per capita in
1992 was half of what it was at independence in 1960.
Another example is that of Nigeria. Sani Abacha was the de facto head of state in
Nigeria during 1993-98. He misappropriated between USD 3-5 billion from Nigerias cur-
rency reserves, hiding the money in Jersey, Liechtenstein, Switzerland and the UK. With
the help of the UK lawyer Tim Daniels, Nigeria has had close to USD 3 bn repatriated.
The president of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, previously married to Benazir Bhutto, has
been tried and found guilty of corruption in Pakistan, Switzerland and the Isle of Man
and tax haven jurisdictions have been involved in these cases.35 A nal example is Daniels
(2012), who lists 14 cases of presidents and government o¢ cials who have stolen money
from their countries.36 Their crimes have all been facilitated by the use of tax havens.
3.4.2 Tearing down institutions
Over the past decade, it has become clear that institutional quality is one of the most im-
portant drivers for economic growth. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) estimate
that a country located in the 25% percentile for institutional quality could increase its
national income sevenfold if it were able to improve its institutional quality su¢ ciently
to move into the 75% percentile.
Among the most damaging aspects of secrecy jurisdictions is the fact that they con-
tribute to the weakening of institutional quality and democracy in poor countries. This is
so because secrecy jurisdictions enable the ruling elite in poor countries to conceal income
derived from corruption, development aid, natural resources or the budget. This makes
such crimes more attractive. Secrecy jurisdictions also o¤er escape clauses that allow
funds quickly to be moved to other tax havens. Such arrangement makes it much harder
to repatriate stolen funds. More importantly, the incentives that tax havens provide also
make it more attractive to dismantle institutions and weaken the workings and control
of the political system.
Theft of state funds is a one way of dismantling institutional quality since these funds
otherwise could have been used to improve institutions. As a case in point, Nigeria, one
of the most corrupt states in the world according to Transparency International, had
up until 2004 not convicted anyone for corruption. When the leader of the corruption
unit, Nuhu Ribadu, had the Nigerias police inspector general imprisoned for corruption
and then went after Nigerias powerful governors, he was sacked. Ribadu also narrowly
escaped an assassination attempt.37
Maxwell Nkole who lead the anti-corruption unit in Zambia under the reform friendly
35See NOU (2009) for a detailed description of these cases.
36http://www.pwyp.no/sites/all/les/TimDaniel.pdf
37A description of this is given in http://international.cgdev.org/article/corruption-ghters-form-close-
knit-club-wall-street-journal
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president Levy Mvanawasa, investigated former president Frederick Chiluba. The investi-
gation revealed that Chiluba had used tax havens to conceal bribes and stolen assets. He
was convicted in London in 2007 and sentenced to pay back 55 million USD to Zambia.
When president Mvanawasa died in 2008, the new president in Zambia, Rupiah Banda,
acquitted Chiluba. When Nkole took the case to the high court he was sacked.38 These
examples show that institutions that are there to keep politicians in check are weakened
in order to facilitate theft. The misuse of power would have been lower if tax havens did
not provide the opportunity to conceal crimes.
Even more worrisome is the possibility that secrecy jurisdictions may a¤ect the po-
litical system in poor countries. Ross (2001) nds that, ceteris paribus, countries with
large oil deposits tend to become less democratic because democracy carries a cost to
politicians who prevent them from using government revenue as they please. Thus, re-
source rents can give the political elite incentives to weaken democracy. In the same vein,
secrecy jurisdictions o¤er income opportunities to the ruling elite in poor countries which
can lead to less democratic control of those in power. These perspectives are worrisome
especially since, as shown by Collier and Hoe­ er, (2009), institutional rules that limit
the potential for the political abuse of power enhance growth. Particularly in developing
countries rich in resources, Collier and Hoe­ er (2009) nd that balances and checksto
limit the power of politicians are undermined by politicians.
A commonly held belief among academics and policymakers has been that the choice of
political system (presidential or parliamentary) is formed by historical choices. However,
Robinson and Torvik (2009) show that this explanation is inadequate. For example,
at independence there were 27 countries south of the Sahara and ve out of 27 were
presidential, while the rest were parliamentary. In 2009, only three out of the 27 countries
were parliamentary (Botswana, Mauritius, and South Africa), two of which (Botswana
and Mauritius) have done much better in economic terms than the rest. Torvik (2009)
makes the point that the transition to presidential rule in southern Africa has given a
narrower political elite greater political power, which has led to a less democratic system
in these countries. Given the substantial amount of evidence showing that presidents
in newly constituted presidential regimes in Africa have abused their power and used
secrecy jurisdictions to hide stolen funds, it is clear that secrecy jurisdictions provide
incentives for personal enrichment through a political career. These incentives may even
have consequences for the types of people who seek a political career.
3.4.3 Tax haven income opportunities and economic growth
In developed and developing countries tax havens represent a private income opportunity.
An interesting question is if the private income opportunity that tax havens o¤er may
38See http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/47e03a88-00ac-11df-ae8d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2RBeaVC5a
and http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/47e03a88-00ac-11df-ae8d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2RHcFNnsH
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harm income in poor countries. Torvik (2002) makes the point that developing coun-
tries to a larger extent than developed countries are characterized by a high crime rate,
rampant corruption and a weak political system. In such a setting, it will be attractive
for people to engage in banditry, tax evasion, corruption and other destructive activities.
Tax havens increase the returns to these activities and makes it more attractive for peo-
ple who engage in legal activity to become involved in illegal activity that is destructive
for the economy. The end outcome may be that private income in equilibrium falls (see
Torvik 2009).
It is impossible to study the e¤ect tax havens have on private income in poor coun-
tries because of secrecy. An indirect way of nding out how tax havens may a¤ect poor
countries is to study how income opportunities that arise in both developing and devel-
oped countries a¤ect income. Natural resources such as gas, oil, and diamonds represents
income opportunities. It is well-known in the economic literature that countries that de-
rive large revenues from the extraction of natural resources have on average a lower level
of GDP growth than countries without income from such resources.39 This paradoxical
phenomenon is often referred to as the resource curseor the paradox of the plenty.
Studying this paradox is an indirect way of estimating how the income opportunities aris-
ing from secrecy jurisdictions a¤ect di¤erent countries. Income from natural resources,
however, give rise to activities that create value related to the extraction of natural re-
sources. This is not the case with the income opportunities created by tax havens. Thus,
the e¤ect on growth from resources probably underestimates possible negative e¤ects of
tax haven. As shall be clear in the continuation, tax havens are part of the explanation
why income from natural resources can be harmful to a country.
Mehlum et al. (2006 a,b) control for an entire range of factors that may explain
why resource abundance may lead to lower growth. They nd that resource-abundant
countries become growth winners or losers depending on the quality of their public insti-
tutions. In countries where the government does not e¤ectively support property rights
and is unable to provide basic security, and where corruption is widespread in the public
bureaucracy, growth is low despite resource richness. Similarly, Boschini et al. (2007)
studied how di¤erent types of natural resources inuence growth and how this depends
on institutional quality. They nd that the decisive factor for the e¤ect on growth is the
combination of institutional quality and the ease with which various natural resources
can be seized.40 Therefore, diamonds are more harmful than oil since they are more easily
extracted.
Secrecy jurisdictions provide incentives to weaken institutional quality (as exemplied
above) so tax havens are part of the explanation for the resource curse. Again it is the
39See Auty (2001) for a survey of these ndings.
40The studies by Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006a,b) and Boschini, Pettersson and Roine (2007)
contrast the popular perception that Dutch disease explains the resource curse. In doing so, they point
out that it is not clear why the crowding out of the traded goods sector should a¤ect institutional quality.
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ability to conceal information that leads to moral hazard and causes harmful e¤ects.
Recently the link between politics and the paradox of the plenty has been illumi-
nated. Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) study whether the democratic system matters for
the resource curse. They show that the resource curse is relevant in democracies with
presidential rule, though not in countries with parliamentary rule. There is no link be-
tween resource abundance and growth in countries with parliamentary rule. Hence, it is
not easy to assess why the resource curse should be more closely linked to presidential
rule, except for the fact that in many developing countries, the type of presidential rule
that has come into play yields much more concentrated power to the president than in
rich countries (see Torvik 2009). This means that a wider circle of the ruling elite de-
pends to a much greater extent on the president, whereas the reverse is often true in
developed countries. As a result, the president in such regimes can pursue policies that
are in his interest, rather than in that of the nation. Secrecy jurisdictions make such
selsh strategies a much more attractive proposition.
4 Some concluding remarks
This paper has provided a survey of tax haven legislation pointing out common core
characteristics. It argues that the legislation in tax havens creates private information
for the users of tax havens that give rise to moral hazard, and it has detailed some of
the costs related to tax havens and moral hazard in di¤erent markets. In a nal step
the paper has argued that developing countries are more harmed by secrecy jurisdictions
than developed countries due to their weak institutions and greater need for tax revenue.
It is worrisome that some major OECD economies like the United States and the
United Kingdom are associated with the term tax havens. Field experiments by Sharman
(2010) and Sharman et al. (2015) show that in these countries standards for corporate
transparency and disclosure are lower than in many tax havens. One reason for this may
be that tax havens have been in the public eye for some time and have been forced to a
higher degree of compliance.
Despite the harmful e¤ects caused by tax havens, the international community has not
clamped down hard on the business model of tax havens. Information exchange treaties,
which is the most severe step taken against tax havens, do not a¤ect their business model.
These treaties allow the exchange of information once a culprit is identied and linked
to a specic tax haven. One can speculate on why the international community do not
address the business model of tax havens more directly. One reason may be that key
countries needed to create political cohesion do benet from the existence of tax havens.
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